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ABSTRACT
Risk is quintessential in agricultural activities and the introduction of innovation in a farm always implies additional 
risks difﬁcult to quantify and identify in advance. Surely farm’s internal and external sources of risk or kind of 
activities determine a complex entrepreneurial scenario but also psychological attitudes, feelings and behaviours of 
the individuals involved, a co-shared mentality and contextual culture may play a critical role as well. The case of 
the passage from conventional to organic agriculture exempliﬁes how a better understanding of “risk” and the related 
facets, perspectives and questions may provide relevant contributions to overcome the commonly shared idea of 
innate conservatism/impulsiveness in certain ﬁrms, economic sectors or class of entrepreneurs, to explain many cases 
of irrational resistance to innovation and to ﬁll that frequent gap between technologists and farmers in the evaluation 
of the possibilities to adopt and implement also those innovations and new technologies necessary to achieve a more 
sustainable agriculture.
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INTRODUCTION
The relations between agriculture, innovation and risk 
cover a wide spectrum of dimensions, implications and 
operative ﬁelds making the entire discussion a particularly 
complex and sensitive issue, not only according a sector 
point of view but also for public opinion as a whole, and 
a peculiar challenge for techno transfer and innovation 
diffusion agents. 
As  some  relevant  studies  have  evidenced  [4],  “risk” 
focuses a relevant attention in the current debate about 
societal dynamics with unavoidable implications for the 
links between agriculture, innovation and technologies. 
Conventional “industrial” agriculture is presently seen 
as a risky activity according to several perspectives. The 
implementation of industrial approaches and visions to 
agriculture remarkably contributed to more than triple 
world  annual  agricultural  production  during  the  past 
century: food security and abundance was largely made 
possible by the development and use of innovations and 
new technologies such as chemical fertilizers, pesticides 
and herbicides, new hybrid crop varieties, the application of 
irrigation in arid regions, and the introduction of powered 
farm  machinery.  The  beneﬁts  achieved  have  however 
come at high costs: farmers’ health is put at risk by the use 
of chemicals and, out of all human activities, this kind of 
agriculture is considered as the source of greatest human 
impact on the environment. Agriculture contributes to 
climate change and reversely climate change negatively 
impacts  agriculture  through  extreme  weather  events, 
altered  seasons  and  changing  precipitation  patterns. 
In addition a too much industrialized food system has 
lowered food quality materialized in increasing diffusion 
in advanced economies of chronic diseases linked to diet 
(obesity,  heart  diseases,  strokes,  Type  2  diabetes  and 
cancer): in several occasions, food is thus putting at risk 
human health. In the same time the modern large scale 
agrobusiness, with its exasperated dynamics, is putting at 
risk the existence of many farmers and rural communities 
in developing countries because in several cases it has 
aggravated rather than solved their conditions [39]. 
This  complex  scenario  is  strictly  linked  to  the  role 
technology  and  innovation  have  played  so  far: 
paradoxically  many  present  barriers  to  forms  of 
sustainable  agriculture  and  rural  development  as  well 
as to the production of healthier food do not result from 
“non-adoption” problems but rather from the adoption 
of certain innovations and technologies promoted in the 
past. 
This dilemma thus explains the nature of the challenge 
innovation diffusion and techno transfer experts have to 
deal with: often in their minds resistances, opposition 
and  non  adoption  still  remain  negative  responses  to 
innovation. Is  it always  true? Is  non  adoption always 
negative? Are  resistance  to  innovation  caused  by  risk 
perceptions  in  farmers  always  negative  signals  as 
well? How risk perception in farmers, as component of 
their  own  knowledge,  may  contribute  to  identify  new 
technological trajectories for example to better redirect 
innovation and new technologies towards sustainability 
in agriculture?
Consider the case of the decision about the transition 
from conventional to organic agriculture: this is a sort 
of  crossroad  where  a  farmer  is  called  to  adopt  some 
innovations necessary to convert to organic and reject 
others involving conventional agriculture and vice versa 
if  deciding  to  maintain  conventional  agriculture.  This 
case  exempliﬁes  how  the  key-issue  is  not  the  simple 
alternative  between  adoption/non  adoption  but  rather 
what kind of innovations and new technologies are worth 
adopting and reasonable for farmers. 
The  question  is  what  “reasonable”  really  means  for 
farmers: many farmers decide to convert to organic, not 
only for economic reasons, but also because they believe 
that organic methods involve less risks for the environment 
seeking at the same time a less risky food supply. Yet the 
transition period from conventional to organic cropping 
systems often may represent a barrier to adopt organic 
approaches  because  considered  a  risky  phase.  During 
this  period  towards  certiﬁcation,  farmers  cannot  earn 
economic  beneﬁts  from  organic  productions  yet  and 
yields may temporarily be decreased for increased weed 
pressures or nutrient deﬁciencies as new crop rotations 
are  becoming  established.  Farmers  may  also  need  to 
acquire different machinery and undertake training and 
learning processes which may lead to reduced income 
as farmers learn new production methods. In brief, in 
addition to the capital resources expended, there is risk 
of the failure in solving environmental problems or the 
generation  of  inadequate  anticipated  environmental 
beneﬁts and outcomes and consequently the creation of 
frustrations, disappointment and mistrusts. 
All this is translated into a risky environment for farmers 
which  deeply  inﬂuence  their  motivations  and  their 
decision-making in the choice between conventional and 
organic agriculture [14].
A risk analysis may provide relevant contributions in the 
understanding  economic  and  operational  motivations 
and causes hampering the passage to organic production 
and the reason why conventional agriculture is preferred 
even when the related risks are well known to farmers. In 
addition, even if connected to many traditional practices 
and  natural  cycles,  the  passage  to  organic  agriculture 
requires speciﬁc skills and know how must be developed: 
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knowledge,  using  new  approaches,  improving  their 
understanding, practicing new methods and techniques 
and  determining  processes  and  factors  that  inﬂuence 
decisions.  In  brief,  these  are  typical  features  and 
characteristics of the activation of an innovative process 
which  implies  support  and  robust  links  of  scientiﬁc 
research  and  extension  institutions  capable  also  to 
positively contribute to activate development processes 
at  local  level.  Nonetheless,  moving  from  theory  to 
practice, one can easily realize that the creation of these 
links is not an easy task: several reasons may cause these 
difﬁculties  among  which  the  commonly  shared  idea, 
in  development  agents,  researchers  or  innovation  and 
technology transfer experts, that farmers are structurally 
conservative entrepreneurs plays a not secondary role. 
They are in fact accused of having scarce innovative and 
management culture and incapability to think in terms 
of  development,  of  showing  high  individualism  and 
irrational worries to modify consolidated practices, over-
evaluating  their  own  experiences.  These  conservative 
behaviours may thus materialize a severe obstacle even 
for the introduction and diffusion of those (technological/
non technological) innovations necessary to promote a 
modern  “less  risky  agriculture”,  to  provide  positive 
contributions  in  reversing  territorial  socio-economic 
decline, to foster adequate local development in terms 
of quality of life of rural communities, to produce better 
and safer food, to achieve environmental protection, to 
support the generation of renewable energy at farm level, 
to generate new and more careers and jobs in farming, to 
revitalize local rural cultures, etc.. 
These  “prejudices”  often  result  from  conventional 
approaches  to  innovation  diffusion  essentially  based 
on the notion that knowledge transfer is fundamentally 
an  uni-directional  process,  being  science  the  only 
generator of new ideas, methods and practices, directed 
to solve speciﬁc technical issues and to pour doses of 
technical facts and messages, in the worst cases, towards 
“ignorant,  ungrateful  and  backward  farmers”.  The 
eventual insurgence of resistances to innovation becomes 
an adjustment and adaptation problem mainly caused by 
inadequacies in information circulation, communication 
problems  or  irrational  oppositions  to  changes.  These 
conditions may be exacerbated by the fact that researchers 
and farmers often know little about each other. All this 
frequently  generates  a  conﬂict  between  “adversaries” 
who consider many aspects of the other’s world, being 
not immediately evident and comprehensible, low proﬁle 
issues. Frequently researchers tend to be not interested 
in many issues considered crucial by farmers and vice 
versa.
The resulting gap, as some empirical observations have 
highlighted [9], may result by the effect of the collision 
of two antithetical visions: the operational point of view 
of an innovation rarely collimates with the pure technical 
and scientiﬁc one. This discrepancy is often translated 
into personal contrasts between technicians and farmers: 
often innovations and changes are suggested by one side 
and rejected by the other. New technologies are generally 
directed to improve production but in the real world their 
implementation is submitted for example to an economic 
point of view: economically viable and technically perfect 
combinations do not always coincide and the opposition 
of a farmer to innovations is not simply due to ignorance 
or indolence because sometimes technologically inferior 
methods  can  be  better  adapted  to  given  conditions. 
At a superﬁcial level the eventual rejection of a given 
innovation may be triggered by differences in the concept 
of utility but different considerations of the involved risks 
may  generate  even  more  profound  contrasts  between 
farmers’  reactions  and  professionals’  considerations: 
technologies, innovations, innovative approaches to farm 
management,  are  mainly  examined  from  the  experts’ 
point  of  view  while  farmers  consider  them  too  risky 
in terms of capital exposure, time, efforts and energy. 
These  reactions,  often  labelled  as  irrational  behaviour 
and  reactions,  seem  maybe  less  well  recognised  and 
poorly studied. Surely some aspects of the problem are 
well known and more easily manageable in conventional 
terms, such as economic or technical risk mitigation of a 
given innovation, while others may put the entire topic 
under a completely different light. 
Clarifying  the  concept  of  risk  and  its  varying  nature 
thus  become  critical  steps  for  the  deﬁnition  and 
implementation  of  knowledge  and  innovative  clusters 
within renewed technological trajectories on the base of 
an integration between the technical (econometric and 
managerial models and approaches) and the human side 
of the issue (psychological and cultural topics).
This integration is an essential step also to understand 
why  do  two  individuals  coping  with  the  same  risky 
decision  related  to  innovation  make  different  choice, 
why does the same individual sometimes make choices 
that  are  apparently  inconsistent  or  when  and  how  is 
an agent a concretely more risk averse than an agent 
b.  These  questions  are  particularly  relevant  for  those 
immediately concerned with development both at farm 
and territorial level: often the introduction of innovation 
has to cope with many operational and practical issues 
and questions to which many theoretical models seem 
unable  to  provide  concrete  answers  to  ﬁt  in  the  real 
world. These models often appear essential contributions 
for the understanding, analysis and description of certain 
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development operators try to implement concretely these 
models and approaches.
The  present  study  is  based  on  activities  and 
observations  carried  out  within  the  research  activities 
of  the  project  “Development  Dynamics  and  Increases 
in Competitiveness of Rural Areas” (DICRA) resulting 
from  an  agreement  between  the  Research  Team  on 
Development and Innovative Processes at the Institute 
of Chemical Methods (I.M.C.) of the National Research 
Council  of  Italy  (C.N.R.)  and  the  Municipality  of 
Vitorchiano (a 4000 inhabitants village in the province of 
Viterbo, about 100 km north of Rome in Central Italy). 
This paper results from the researches conducted about 
causes and sources on inertial behaviours among farmers 
and other local agents in the rural area interested by the 
project.  Risk  aversion  actually  resulted  as  a  relevant 
source of inaction and no choices hampering innovation 
adoption as conﬁrmed by many replies from contacted and 
interviewed people in the survey. The role of risk aversion 
in activating inertial responses has thus stimulated our 
questioning  about  the  involved  mechanisms  with  the 
adoption of speciﬁc further analyses and reﬂections on the 
interviews and questionnaires of 10 local farmers using 
the case of the transition from conventional to organic 
agriculture:  these  analyses  have  permitted  to  identify 
some interrelated problematic dimensions deriving from 
these different natures of risk where synthetically many 
risk variables can be grouped:
• Economic dimension;
• Sector (agricultural) dimension;
• Innovation dimension;
• Behavioural dimension.
A detailed analysis of risk in organic agriculture is not 
the aim of this study but rather to provide, also on the 
base of some empirical observations and considerations, 
some operative contributions in the description of the 
main characteristics and features of these dimensions and 
their interrelations capable to produce relevant inﬂuences 
during  the  decision-process  in  the  choice  between 
different  farm  management  approaches  with  critical 
effects in the modalities through which innovations are 
adopted or rejected. 
The dimension of Economic Risk
“A  conversion  to  organic  agriculture  is  too  risky,  too 
many extra costs”, “There’s little market space for organic 
products”, “Too much uncertainty, too many norms and 
regulations”, “Opting for organic is risky because there 
are too many changes in farm organization: all this is 
expansive”, “If it doesn’t work, I’ll lose a lot of money”, 
One  of  the  most  difﬁcult  topics  when  talking  with 
farmers and other rural entrepreneurs is in general how to 
deﬁne risk. Risk is depicted as a vague and opaque object 
where  a  sense  of  discomfort,  losses  and  uncertainty 
live  side  by  side  with  fear  of  changes  and  hazard 
when  facing  certain  kind  of  decisions.  The  essential 
idea underlying the concept of risk is the image of an 
exposure to a potential loss or damage: in the attempt 
to  achieve  a  favourable  outcome  may  be  hidden  the 
possibility that some negative event will occur. It means 
that the decision maker may be aware of the probability 
of the existence of a potential loss (whose dimensions 
may  be  not  fully  acknowledged)  deriving  from  some 
present processes or future events: risk and uncertainty 
are thus linked by a somewhat relation. In some studies 
risk and uncertainty are identiﬁed as different concepts 
[3] being the former connected to known probabilities 
(quantitative and measurable dimension) while the latter 
related to unknown probabilities (non-quantitative and 
non-measurable dimension). Uncertainty hence mostly 
describes the environment in which certain decisions are 
made while risk characterizing the relevant implications 
of uncertainty. 
A provision of an exhaustive survey about a deﬁnition 
of risk is not the aim of the present paper: however it 
is important to highlight some relevant studies [19, 37] 
which have been essentially focused on the analysis of 
risk variability (deriving from outcome uncertainty or 
lack of knowledge about potential outcomes), feelings 
of risk (deriving from outcome expectations i.e. degree 
of disappointment in case of negative results or from 
outcome impacts and their potential to act as a threat) and 
in general on individual/group risk behaviour (reactions 
coping with risk decisions).
In the commonly shared opinion, risk is correlated only 
to  the  negative  effects  deriving  from  the  action  of  a 
number of different classes of variables from different 
dimensions:  nature  (earthquakes,  storms,  hurricanes), 
technology (failures, faults, imperfections, defects, costs), 
human  (errors,  inabilities,  incapability,  unintentional 
actions), etc.. having however economic implications and 
consequences. As any other entrepreneur, a farmer has to 
cope with several kind of risks: risk to fail, risk to misjudge, 
risk to misunderstand, risk to lose, risk to waste money 
and time, etc.. When coping with unreliable and doubtful 
activities, risk is considered by entrepreneurs a cost to 
be moderated often implying psychological discomforts, 
changes in praxes and operative rules, time and money 
consuming correction activities, etc.. These conditions 
may  be  exacerbated  in  case  of  contexts  characterized 
by high levels of uncertainty and competition, certain 
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geographical location, etc.. 
In certain circumstances risk may be beneﬁcial for an 
efﬁcient ﬁrm because it creates stimuli for adaptation to 
changing conditions: on the contrary inefﬁcient ﬁrms are 
likely to be particularly weak to risks which have to be 
absolutely avoided. Changes are thus impeded, innovation 
diffusion  altered,  new  products’/services’  formulation 
hampered, renewed organization models denied, etc..
Economic  risks  may  be  initially  grouped  into  two 
main  classes  of  risk:  internal  and  external  ﬁrm’s 
risks.  Internal  risks  usually  derives  from  ﬁrm’s  inner 
structural capability/vulnerability towards changes or the 
introductions of innovations due to unwillingness (fear 
to change, consolidated and ossiﬁed interests, cultural 
and mental factors) and/or an inability (organizational 
problems,  difﬁculties  in  decision  making  processes 
or incapability in perceiving opportunities and need to 
change) to take risk choices. Firms characterized by high 
risk aversion levels essentially try to avoid a violation of 
predictability in the (internal/external) operative context 
risky  choices  may  erode  mainly  conﬁding  to  familiar 
standards, routines and patterns sometimes even when 
potentially  better  alternatives  have  become  available 
[31, 41, 51]. Relying on routines and on familiar patterns 
may be a positive strategy for managing risk but when 
routines are too rigid and ossiﬁed, they may become a 
symptom of an excessive and pathological conservative 
ﬁrm  behaviour.  These  behaviours  are  inﬂuenced  by 
several factors such as: 
a) the ﬁrm’s cultural risk values - inner values inﬂuencing 
the tendency to tolerate or avoid certain levels of risk 
and the tendency to prefer stability/certainty instead of 
instability/uncertainty;
b) conformism;
c)  organizational  control  systems  -  those  mechanisms 
inﬂuencing  the  modalities  through  which  outcomes 
of  risky  decisions  are  rewarded  or  punished  and/or 
risk taking/risk avoiding is encouraged or discouraged 
with  incentives/disincentives  to  undertake/refuse  risky 
initiatives. 
In addition a ﬁrm’s risk behaviour may be altered and 
exacerbated by different forms of decisions’ pathologies 
Table 1 Types of operative risks 
Type of Risk  Definition 
Low risk (remote)  low  probability  and  low  damage  caused  by  the 
undesired event occurring, not occurred before, easy to 
control, low financial impact, limited impacts on firm’s 
strategies  and  operative  activities,  modest  individual 
concern 
Mid risk (possible)  mid  probability  and  mid  damage  caused  by  the 
undesired  event  occurring,  it  could  occur  more  than 
once  within  the  time  period,  difficult  to  control, 
moderate financial impact, moderate impacts on firm’s 
strategies and operative activities, moderate individual 
concern 
High risk (probable)  potential of its occurring several times within the time 
period, it has occurred recently, high probability and 
high damage caused by the undesired event occurring 
(dread  risk  -  perceived  lack  of  control,  catastrophic 
potential,  fatal  consequences,  inequitable  distribution 
of  risks  and  benefits,  etc…),  high  financial  impacts, 
significant  impacts  on  organization’s  strategies  or 
operational activities, significant individual concern 
Unknown risk  vague  ideas  and  visions  of  unexpected  effects  and 
consequences  from  the  undesired  event  occurring 
(unobservable,  unknown,  new  and  delayed  in  the 
manifestation of harm) 
Avoidable risk  undesired  event  which  can  be  prevented  from 
occurring 
Acceptable risk  tolerable  level  of  damages  caused  by  the  undesired 
event  occurring  which  can  be  easily  predicted  and 
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such  as  myopia  (wrong  opinions  and  visions  for 
example  on  long  term  issues  or  about  the  effects  of 
long  term  investments  caused  by  excessive  prudence/
impulsiveness),  negation  (denial  to  take  into  account 
certain  information  about  risky  events),  vested  values 
(ossiﬁed and deep rooted values) or capabilities gap (lack 
of speciﬁc capabilities required to cope with a choice 
involving risk). 
Internal  sources  of  risk  may  be  aggravated  or 
accompanied by external risks related to the volatility of 
the marketplace or the peculiarities of certain activities 
which may be more risky than others. The complexities 
of physical and economic systems they rely on and the 
characteristics of the operative scenario and processes 
(which may be characterized by factors and dynamics 
that cannot be forecast with absolute accuracy) may pose 
these activities on rather fragile bases. The immediate 
implication of the presence of uncertainty clouds for the 
economic agents concerned is that a considerable variety 
of  possible  outcomes  is  usually  associated  with  each 
chosen action or decision related of different classes of 
risks (table1).
A quantiﬁcation of risk has been at the core of studies 
in several disciplines in particular in applied economics, 
through the Expected Utility (EU) and Prospect theories 
(and the notion of “risk aversion”) [2, 28, 45, 48, 54], and 
in management studies focused on “risk management” 
[20, 59] (analytical tools and strategies directed to create a 
systematic and gradual process focused on keeping under 
control  different  kinds  of  risk  at  strategic,  economic, 
technical implementation and operational level).
In general terms, these studies have been biased on the 
modalities through which economic decisions, directed 
to  achieve  the  optimal  allocation  of  scarce  resources, 
are made involving: a) obtaining information from the 
environment regarding possible actions; b) valuing those 
actions,  and  c)  choosing  between  them. According  to 
these theoretical models these processes are, in principle, 
measurable and they can be articulated mathematically 
describing  optimization  problems  that  generate 
empirically testable predictions.
The behaviour of an economic agent in risky conditions can 
consequently be expressed through a line encompassing: 
a) risk aversion – the assurance of the expected result 
(value) is always preferred to an uncertain higher value 
one; b) risk neutrality – agent’s indifference between a 
guaranteed expected result and an uncertain one and c) 
risk tolerance/propensity – the agent’s choice is given to 
an uncertain and risky higher value option rather than the 
assurance of the expected result (value). 
Some  studies  have  identiﬁed  the  “Safety  First” 
principle to describe a decision maker’s reactions when 
coping with risk decisions. According to this principle 
individuals tend to make decisions trying to reduce the 
possibilities  of  falling  below  some  minimum  which 
may  be  economically  or  culturally  identiﬁed  [58]. 
Coping with different risky options, individuals should 
tend to opt for choices showing the lowest probability 
of  falling  below  some  economic  minimum  regardless 
of the expected potential results in order to reduce the 
occurring  of  certain  economic  damages.  In  particular, 
this principle often is used to explain causes and sources 
of  forms  “rural”  conservatism  toward  innovation  and 
change: these forms of risk aversion, expressed by a too 
rigid adherence to tradition or custom are conventionally 
found in ignorance or lack of education which push this 
minimum to a very high level. High risk aversion degree 
in farmers thus should result from a crude and rational 
cost-beneﬁt  analysis  about  their  real  and  perceived 
uncertain and precarious enterprise economic situations 
and/or  eventual  real  and  perceived  difﬁcult  enterprise 
economic situations as effects of risky decisions which 
unavoidably  translated  risk  aversion  into  innovation 
rejection.
On the base of these premises, the degree of risk aversion 
should decline with wealth because the marginal value 
of one euro when an individual is poor is higher than 
he  is  rich.  Many  mathematical  models  developed  by 
economic theory have been however criticized: as many 
studied  have  evidenced  [36,  17],  these  models  seem 
unable to describe and explain many circumstances in 
which risk aversion appears characterized not only by an 
economic rationale but also by a substantial amount of 
“heterogeneity” which, for the conventional economic 
theory, remains unexplained. Given this heterogeneity, 
many  aspects  of  economic  risk  aversion  are  likely  to 
have a sort of unobservable nature in economic empirical 
analyses  where  the  eventual  insurgence  of  different 
attitudes could be simply labelled as irrational behaviours: 
but is it always true? 
The  dimension  of  Sector  Risk:  conventional  and 
organic agriculture
“Organic  agriculture  is  unproﬁtable”,  “Yields  are 
lowered”,  “With  organic  methods  you’ll  cultivate 
only  weeds”.  “Before  passing  to  organic  agriculture, 
I thought it was not reliable”, “I’m already struggling 
with conventional agriculture: I don’t want to embrace 
additional risks with the organic one”
Agriculture per se is a typical example of risky activity 
because risk and uncertainty constitute essential features 
of the production environment [22, 26, 27, 40]. Typical 
risks may derive for example by the fact that agriculture 
directly depends on natural and biological cycles: thus 
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and diseases may represent remarkable sources of risks. 
Other sources of risks are generated by the interaction of 
large number of variables originating from:
a) Production uncertainty: farmers cannot foresee with 
certainty quantity and quality of their productions on the 
base of a given amount of inputs for the action of some 
uncontrollable  elements  for  example  weather  or  time 
when long production lags are biologically necessary in 
crop and livestock production. 
b) Price uncertainty: production lags causes that many 
agricultural production decisions have to be made far in 
advance of realizing the ﬁnal product on the base of a 
limited knowledge about the market price for the output. 
This condition is aggravated by high market volatility 
generated  by  demand  ﬂuctuations,  a  large  number  of 
competitive producers, a relatively homogeneous output, 
etc.  Production  uncertainty  and  price  uncertainty  are 
strictly  correlated  because  prices  adjust  according  to 
output’s quantity and quality and to market forces and 
viceversa. 
c)  Technological  and  innovation  uncertainty:  due  to 
production uncertainty and time lags, the impacts from 
the adoption of certain innovations and new technologies 
cannot be valuated in advance. For this reason innovation 
success/failure  deeply  inﬂuences  ﬁnal  results  when 
correction measures have limited effects. 
d) Policy uncertainty; economic policies have impacts 
on  all  sectors  through  for  examples  taxes,  interest, 
rates, exchange rates, regulation, provision of subsidies 
and  incentives,  etc.  In  case  of  contexts  characterized 
by  an  intricate  system  of  government  interventions,  a 
confused normative framework, continuing changes in 
policy interventions and strategies, all this constitutes a 
relevant source of uncertainty and considerable risks for 
investments.
The combined and simultaneous actions of these different 
sources and forms of risk make the decision environment 
Table 2: Classification of Risks in Agriculture 
Source of risks  Description 
Weather  Risks with predictable frequency: hail, frost, wind 
Risks with unpredictable frequency: drought, flood, storm 
Production Factors  Factors’ productivity: i.e. not suitable seeds 
Factors’ contamination: i.e. mycotoxins 
Factors’ limitation: i.e. agro-environmental restrictions  
Infesting  and  Pathological 
Factors 
Infesting plants 
Fungi 
Viruses 
Insects 
Combined pathological diseases 
Output characteristics  Health and hygienic standards 
Production quality: contract standards, quality standards 
Service quality: i.e. agritourism  
Innovation and technology  Too complex 
Hard to manage 
Not compatible with farm objectives  
Not flexible enough 
Unprofitable 
Too expansive 
Too much additional learning required 
Unclear and conflicting information 
Producer’s skills  Inadequate management skills 
Marketplace  Price volatility 
Scarce transparency 
Contracts’ terms and conditions  
Finance and Credit  Access to credit 
Variable interest rates 
Variable tax rates 
Institutional factors  International trade agreements 
Quotas 
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for  farmers  and  other  rural  entrepreneurs  particularly 
complex  and  uncertain  (table  2).  Even  if  farmers,  in 
certain circumstances, may adopt strategies and tools to 
reduce these risks thanks to some protection approaches 
(technical interventions or insurances), risks may severely 
affects choice process and ultimately may also alter the 
capability of the decision maker to correctly focus the 
nature itself of the problems involved in the decision 
process with relevant consequences for the possibility to 
positively manage them. 
In  organic  agriculture  (real/perceived)  risks  may  be 
exacerbated for its major resilience on the natural processes 
of ecosystems and for the exclusion of substantial risk 
management  tools  such  as  synthetic  chemicals  and 
antibiotics commonly adopted in conventional agriculture 
[16]. In addition, to reduce economic exposure risks, the 
transition to organic production must be analyzed also 
in economic terms in order to identify future economic 
opportunities, evaluate those realities already operating 
in the territory and market dynamics.
It  means  that  organic  agriculture  shares  some  typical 
risks of conventional agriculture which however have 
to  be  differently  managed:  organic  farmers  have  to 
highly rely on their understanding and management of 
cultural practices (crop rotation, timing of planting and 
harvesting,  mechanical  cultivation,  beneﬁcial  insects, 
etc..)  to  deal  with  many  classes  and  types  of  risk. 
Other risks may be classiﬁed as temporary risks such 
as shortages in organic inputs or as in the case of those 
arising during the transition period (generally three years) 
from conventional to organic: yields may drop, economic 
return may be reduced, etc.. The risk of contamination of 
land or crops with prohibited chemicals or genetically-
modiﬁed organisms (GMO’s) is an example of persisting 
over  time  risk  facing  an  organic  farmer  which  may 
involve  the  loss  of  organic  certiﬁcation  and  loss  of 
markets. As many surveys have conﬁrmed, the potential 
pest and weed outbreaks during the so-called “ecological” 
transition period and GMO contaminations cause major 
concerns  in  farmers  acting  as  main  source  of  risk  in 
organic agriculture [21].
The  presence  of  several  distinct  sources  of  risks  in 
conventional/organic  agriculture  thus  generates  a 
complex  network  of  interactions  among  different 
variables,  which  may  occur  at  several  points  in  time, 
whose analytical description may become a very difﬁcult 
task. In literature several stylized theoretical models and 
empirical analyses have been developed which generally 
describe decision making dynamics based on the rational 
idea of the farmer’s proﬁt maximization [40]. In the same 
time, being economic risk a function of individual wealth, 
poorer farmers are more risk vulnerable: the presence of 
high risk aversion among these farmers could thus be 
explained by their attempt to reduce their exposure to 
avoidable risks. 
The  case  of  the  conversion  to  organic  agriculture 
may  however  highlight  that  concepts  such  as  utility 
maximization, income levels, differences in wealth as well 
as farming methods, technical aspects or farm structure 
are  surely  important  variables  but  cannot  explain  per 
se the heterogeneity of choices in a risky environment 
because  also  personal  values  and  visions  may  play  a 
critical  role  in  decision  making  and  in  the  modalities 
through which innovation is adopted or rejected. 
The risk to innovate
“I  prefer  not  to  risk”,  “Too  many  changes”,  “Before 
becoming an organic farmer I knew very little about it: 
I  contacted  some  researchers  looking  for  information 
because I didn’t know what to do and what to expect 
from the transition to organic”, “I prefer to keep on doing 
what I have always done”
The transition from conventional to organic agriculture 
provides an interesting example where technical experts 
and  farmers  often  may  shows  forms  of  disagreement 
when evaluating a given innovation disputing whether 
the involved risks are more or less acceptable/tolerable or 
existent/inexistent. This situation may result by the fact 
that ecological and environmental reasons or economic 
incentives are not always sufﬁcient to motivate farmers 
to adopt organic approaches and to bring about changes. 
The idea of the organic farmer as a “back-to-land” type is 
completely misleading because organic farming requires 
adequate management and marketing skills, commitment, 
deep understanding of ecological systems, information, 
access to research results and links research institutions 
and proper training. 
Switching from usual and familiar practices and methods 
to an unknown system may become a difﬁcult task for the 
presence of several constrains causing blocking effects 
deriving  by  uncertainty.  These  conditions  are  typical 
features  of  innovation  which  is  by  deﬁnition  a  risk 
condensed  issue  because  knowledge  about  innovation 
features and implications is generally incomplete; it is 
unclear how innovation will perform, when it will be 
fully operative and how it will affect the relative actors’ 
positions.  Thus  innovation,  uncertainty  and  implicit/
explicit risks are strictly linked. 
Any  innovative  process  may  be  included  within  a 
continuum between two extremes: from a) low scope, risk 
and proﬁle, slow evolutionary and incremental changes 
which do not modify the general framework to b) high 
scope, risk and proﬁle, radical, strategic and disruptive 
ones [15, 38]. Innovation adoption and implementation “DO THE RIGHT THING”: INNOVATION DIFFUSION AND RISK DIMENSIONS IN THE PASSAGE FROM CONVENTIONAL TO 
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involves a mix of these features implying a number of 
choices and decisions generally inﬂuenced by the decision 
maker’s  experience  and  familiarity  with  the  situation/
problem as critical tools in limiting risk magnitude thanks 
to past ability to manage and solve similar problems. 
The  scarce  and  incomplete  information  base,  usually 
accompanying innovation, limits this individual ability 
and familiarity: for this reason problem framing, or the 
modalities through which a situation is presented to a 
decision maker in a positive or negative light, plays a 
critical role in representing an innovation (and the related 
consequences) as an opportunity or a problem in terms of 
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Table 3: Categories of Innovation Adopters 
Category  Features 
innovators  rather  isolated  individuals  showing  the  ability  to  understand  and  apply  complex 
technological/non technological knowledge, to cope with high risk and uncertainty about the 
innovation (very low risk aversion) and to stimulate the flow of innovation into a firm. They are 
inclined to adopt innovation on the base of limited evidence 
early adopters  better  integrated  individuals  showing  the  ability  to  understand  and  apply  technological/non 
technological knowledge, to cope with mid risk and uncertainty about the innovation (low risk 
aversion) and to trigger the critical mass when they adopt an innovation 
first majority  they adopt innovation just before the average number of the group and interconnect the next 
large group to innovation. Innovation decision period for this group is relatively long but adopt 
innovation with deliberate willingness. Mid risk aversion
late majority  they adopt innovation just after the majority by economic necessity or through peer pressure. 
This group is sceptical and cautious and they do not adopt a new idea unless most neighbouring 
people have done so. This group demands that most of the uncertainty and risk of innovation is 
removed before they are ready to adapt (high risk aversion)
stragglers  they take decisions about innovation in terms of what has been done previously interacting 
primarily with others that have traditional values. Stragglers tend to be suspicious of innovation 
and change agents. Their inertia and resistance to innovation can appear somehow irrational but 
it may be entirely rational from their point of view, as they must be sure that a new idea will not 
fail before the can adopt it (very high risk aversion)
gains and losses.
Problem  framing  processes  are  highly  inﬂuenced  by 
“cultural  transmission”,  Word–of-Mouth  (WOM) 
and  imitation  mechanisms  at  the  base  of  innovation 
diffusion which in literature is described by the S-shaped 
cumulative curve [24, 50] (ﬁgure 1).
In  this  curve,  which  describes  the  normal  innovation 
adoption or the innovation degree distributed throughout 
the  population,  adoption  time  and  innovation  are 
inversely  correlated:  it  assumes  that  few  individuals 
(with a high inclination to innovation) will constitute the 
ﬁrst adopters’ group, the majority will adopt innovation 122 Journal of Central European Agriculture Vol 11 (2010) No 1
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within  an  intermediated  period  and  few  individuals 
(with a limited innovativeness) will lag behind adopting 
innovation lately. This S-curve thus delineates different 
adopters’ categories on the base of their behaviour (table 
3).
In the conﬁguration of these adoption categories, risk 
plays a critical role: many studies [24, 25] have conﬁrmed 
that ﬁrst adopters usually are more risk prone, with a 
more elevated social status and ﬁnancial resources. This 
is to say that wider social networks or prominent social 
status have scarce inﬂuence on the individual possibility 
to  innovate  but  they  may  become  critical  factors  for 
innovation diffusion among the majority because, being 
a cultural pattern, also a risk behaviour can be transmitted 
in social networks through conformism (how many have 
adopted/rejected) or prestige (who has adopted/rejected) 
increasing/hampering the frequency of its adoption. This 
determines speciﬁc scenarios based on the characteristics 
of social networks operating around certain individuals 
and their capability to spread, also through WOM, risk 
feelings  and  behaviours.  These  mechanisms,  together 
with emotional pushes and individual attitudes to risk 
are at the base of certain reactions towards innovation 
having often more impact than scientiﬁc or technical/
technological evaluations of objective rational economic 
risk levels: often experts judge risk in a strict correlation 
with  technical  estimates  of  innovation  failure  while 
a  farmer  rejects  the  same  innovation  because  he/she 
has been told that there is the risk of economic losses, 
hazards, lack of control, etc..
This gap in visions and perspectives is based on the fact 
that every innovation (technological/non technological) 
has  a  unique  bouquet  of  qualities  that  appears  to  be 
related  to  its  perceived  risk.  Many  conﬂicts  between 
experts  and  farmers  regarding  the  adoption  of  certain 
innovations  and  the  acceptability  of  the  related  risks, 
are the result of different perspectives of risk, producing 
different assessments of the magnitude of the risk of a 
given action or technology, rather than differences in the 
acceptability of the levels of risk. 
When a farmer has to deal with the decision to invest 
in organic agriculture with extra costs (i.e. re-tooling, 
purchasing  additional  equipment,  extra  storage 
requirements,  addition  labor,  etc..)  and  an  inevitable 
“learning curve” (associate with managing a new system), 
he/she has an incomplete knowledge about the capability 
of the investment to be really worth adopting. He/she is 
facing a dilemma: he/she may decide to opt for organic 
hoping that this choice will become proﬁtable, but the 
investment may turn out to be unproﬁtable. He/she may 
also decide to delay his/her decision, waiting for more 
technical information, see the others’ behaviour, listen 
to eventual suggestions but in the meanwhile this will 
mean a potential loss if the innovation turns out to be 
proﬁtable. 
These questions accompanied any “standard” innovative 
cycle (ﬁgure 2) which can be divided into three main 
periods (table 4). 
The identiﬁcation of these periods and phases highlights 
the  critical  role  time  plays  within  the  entire  cycle:  if 
decisions and operative choices are made in a too long 
time,  due  to  high  risk  aversion  levels  in  the  decision 
maker,  the  innovation  potentials  of  period  B  will 
progressively decrease. On the other hand a too short 
period  C  or  too  impulsive  decisions  might  activate 
adaptation problems and the related risks. The adoption 
of incorrect choices thus may provoke sudden increases 
in risk aversion levels with consequent phenomena of 
inertia,  ﬁerce  oppositions  to  innovation,  sabotage  and 
luddism. Period C is essentially related to a modiﬁcation 
innovation 
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time
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POINT
starting point explosion adaptation routine
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in risk nature connected to innovation: during period A 
risk essentially depends on technical issues connected 
to innovation potential failure and costs, while during 
period  B  it  depends  mainly  on  cultural  and  learning 
issues in the human resources involved. C period, being 
highly characterized by decision making processes, may 
thus inﬂuence modes and times in which A and B periods 
are managed, creating extremely different results in the 
farming approach. 
If a farmer remarks his intention to reduce economic, 
technical and adaptation costs related to innovation, thus 
conﬁrming his/her high risk aversion degree, he/she is 
showing  his/her  limited  unwillingness  to  enter  period 
A:  he/she  prefers  to  activate  mainly  a  period  B.  The 
approaches necessary to cope with this kind of farms are 
likely to be essentially biased on imitation and manageable 
predictability with higher emphasis on the possibility to 
copy from others’ experience thus reducing the risk of 
innovation (technical and economic) failure. Fewer risks 
mean  reduced  unexpected  and  sunk  costs  and  limited 
internal conﬂicts during the implementation phase; this 
kind of farm will enter the market late, through paths 
already explored and exploited by others (ﬁrst majority/
late  majority  of  adopters).  Particularly  conservative 
farmers (late majority of adopters and stragglers) tend 
even to imitate at the end of period B when innovation 
has entered a maturity and routine no risk phase.
On the contrary farms showing high responsiveness to 
innovation and a related low risk aversion degree tend 
to enter period A and, after an extremely short period C, 
quite rapidly pass towards (rather short) period B also to 
be ready for a subsequent innovative cycle. These farms 
Table 4: Periods and Phases of the Innovative Cycle
Type of 
Period
Characteristics 
Period A  In this period innovation irrupts into the farm in exploration, experimentation, planning and first 
exploitation  phases  with  the  first  eventual  economic  benefits  of  innovation.  Innovation  is 
“young”: it shows high economic potential because it detains its maximum level of novelty and 
originality  and  provides  high  levels  of  competitiveness.  To  a  high  economic  potential 
corresponds a parallel high risk potential: something “new” is always linked to uncertain factors 
which cannot be fully analyzed and evaluated in advance and its introduction can generate 
unexpected results. 
Period B  This is a deployment period implying an adjustment phase which ends with a maturity phase. 
This period is characterized by increases in innovation maturity which progressively loses its 
innovative character. Activation of routines, simplified and standardized processes. Innovation 
shows a limited economic potential with a parallel decrease in risk and uncertainty. 
Period C  Intermediate and critical phase during which operative choices and decisions are adopted to 
move  from  A  to  B period. During  this  turning  point phase  many  evaluations  about risk in 
economic, technical and adaptation terms are carried out producing remarkable variations in risk 
aversion degree within a farm. 
are mainly focused on the left side of the diagram: they 
are  highly  based  on  innovation  which  can  potentially 
generate great economic beneﬁts, being the ﬁrst to enter 
the  market  during  B  period,  but  having  to  deal  with 
parallel higher risks. These farmers have to be adequately 
informed about higher risks linked to innovation failure 
and costs at experimental and implementation stage and, 
above all, about those levels of farm’s ﬂexibility necessary 
to cope with adjustment problems. This ﬂexibility degree 
hence has to be carefully evaluated in advance to grant 
adequate  success  margins  to  the  innovative  process 
adopted.
The behavioural dimension: when risk emotions become 
operative and economic variables
The above sections have highlighted the role of some 
critical factors in determining risk within each dimension 
such as utility maximizing, time constraints, income, costs 
and beneﬁts, expenditures reduction, farm ﬂexibility, etc.. 
Nonetheless, many behavioural patterns always underlie 
the  performing  dynamics  within  the  above  described 
dimensions because ﬁnally the idea to “do the right thing” 
inspires individual choices and the eventual adoption or 
rejection of a given innovation: this notion results also by 
behavioural reactions to risk. 
In  everyday  experience,  we  may  notice  that  feelings 
of risks [30, 35] emerge when taking a decision about 
a  choice  whose  expected  outcomes  are  uncertain  and 
the  potential  outcome  set  may  include  some  extreme 
consequences. Risk derives from a chain composed of 
choices, decisions, uncertainty, outcomes, consequences 
but also expectations and prospects. The articulation of 
this chain highly depends on decision maker’s behaviour 124 Journal of Central European Agriculture Vol 11 (2010) No 1
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on the base of his:
•  risk  propensity  -  the  individual’s  risk  taking 
tendency  [52]  which  expresses  a  general  individual 
willingness to take risks also inﬂuencing the modalities 
through which risks are evaluated or considered more or 
less acceptable;
•  risk  preferences  –  they  materialize  risk 
propensity [12] translating also the individual attitude 
to avoid failure, the individual inclination to undertake 
speciﬁc risky decisions or not and to take or avoid speciﬁc 
risks; 
•  risk  perceptions  -  the  decision  maker’s 
assessment of the risk inherent in a situation [43], deﬁned 
in terms of the decision maker’s labelling of situations, 
probabilistic estimates of the extent and controllability of 
risk and the conﬁdence in those estimates; they may have 
a relevant role in decision maker’s behaviour because 
they  may  drive  to  deny  uncertainty,  overestimate  or 
underestimate risks, wrong judgements and knowledge 
and  limit  the  individual  ability  to  perform  under  risk 
conditions. 
In general terms, a decision maker’s behaviour coping 
with a risky decision is the result of the contemporary 
and often conﬂicting action of emotional forces (fear, 
anxiety,  passion  reasons  and  motivations,  etc.)  and 
rational  forces  (costs  and  beneﬁts,  advantages  and 
disadvantages, voluntary analyses and decisions, practical 
motivations  and  scopes,  probability  or  desirability  of 
associated  consequences,  etc.).  The  interplay  between 
these two dimensions may be complicated by the choice 
characteristics as in the case of complexity (making a 
choice based on complex decisions or perceived as such) 
which may increase anxiety in individuals caused by the 
fear of making the wrong choice. In theory emotional 
reactions  and  cognitive/rational  evaluations  should 
normally work in concert to guide decision making but 
many studies [30, 34, 35, 55] have evidenced that when 
emotional reactions diverge from cognitive evaluations, 
emotional reactions often exert a dominating inﬂuence 
on behaviour. Consequently emotional reactions to risks 
may diverge from cognitive evaluations on the same risk 
with the generation of emotions in conﬂict with cognitive 
rational  evaluations  pushing  individuals  for  example 
towards  a  decisions  clearly  diverging  from  rationale, 
inertia, impulsive decisions. Further factors may amplify 
or  reduce  this  divergence  [35]:  immediacy  of  a  risk, 
probabilities  that  the  outcomes  are  different  from  the 
way they are expected, time lag between decision and 
the outcome of the decision, vividness or preparedness to 
certain emotional reactions, intuition, automatic and quick 
reactions, images and associations, fear, dread, anxiety, 
etc.. The simultaneous interplay among these factors may 
push  individuals  also  to  overweight/underweight  rare 
events [46] thus inﬂuencing risk assessment. 
The prevailing of emotional forces over rational ones, 
and  their  insensitiveness  to  variations  in  probability 
may  explain  why,  in  certain  circumstances,  a  small 
percentage of the occurrence of a certain outcome may 
provoke great concern and concomitant effort to avert 
it (risk aversion) or imprudent behaviours. In addition, 
individual response to the consequences of rare events on 
the base of personal experience of adverse consequences 
may lead to precautionary or self protective behaviour 
increasing  feelings  of  worry  and  decreasing  personal 
feelings of controllability in certain situations. 
Some studies [18] have highlighted that warnings on risk 
may be more effective when they are linked to people 
and  anecdotes  than  when  they  are  based  on  statistics 
(psychophysical  numbing)  evidencing  that  personal 
emotions,  experiences  or  events  interesting  known 
people may predominate over crude statistical data or 
cost-beneﬁt evaluations. 
All  this  conﬁrms  that  a  decision  maker  under  risk 
frequently tend to evaluate risk cognitively (costs and 
beneﬁts, outcomes, probabilities, etc.) but to react to it 
emotionally (fear, anxiety, inertia, impulsiveness, etc.) 
[5, 60, 61] thus explaining certain cases of apparently 
irrational  resistance  or  inertia  towards  innovations  or 
conditions of change [8, 9]. 
Other  studies  have  highlighted  that  risk  behaviour 
may be inﬂuenced also by other factors such as gender 
-  male  individuals  tend  to  be  more  risk  averse  than 
female  individuals  due  to  differences  in  emotional 
responsiveness (female individuals are likely to report 
more and better imagery than male individuals) [7, 23] 
– or ageing - young individuals tend to underestimate the 
negative consequences of an event or the occurrence of 
the outcomes of risky behaviour due to differences in risk 
perceptions [57]. 
In  addition  risk  may  scale  up  at  group  and  social 
level  becoming  a  “diffused  feeling  of  risk”  [49]  i.e. 
through  anxiety  induction  (by  consequences’  intensity 
manipulation  and  ampliﬁcation)  thus  becoming  a  sort 
of  strategy  to  artiﬁcially  induce  defensive  reactions, 
high levels of fear and anxiety and provoking defensive 
avoidance phenomena and information avoidance [33]. 
Thanks to WOM processes and reciprocal, self enforcing 
inﬂuences in behaviour within social groups with potential 
self-reinforcing  feedback  effects,  fear  and  mistrust 
increase emotional stimuli and these stimuli intensify new 
fear and mistrust responses: for this reason relatively mild 
difﬁdence may rapidly soar into diffused total rejection, 
mild fears into panic with public concern or mistrust about 
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the underlying risk. The resulting phenomena is a social 
ampliﬁcation of risk [29] triggered by the occurrence of 
an adverse major/minor event, a discovery of unexpected 
consequences, economic losses, etc.: risk reactions may 
be transmitted by WOM, through percolation phenomena 
within social networks having scale free dynamics [11], or 
by media capable to turn a previously ignored or scarcely 
considered risk into a commonly shared risky opinion 
with potential consequences for a wide range of people. 
Risk  ampliﬁcation  activates  consequential  waves  and 
circular  outward  pushes  propagating  negative  impacts 
of a given event far beyond the direct implications to 
the  involved  people  and  may  be  massively  translated 
for example into non adoption of certain technologies, 
products  or  innovations.  In  particular  WOM  chains’ 
multiple mechanisms imply that direct impacts need not 
to be too large to trigger major indirect impacts because 
negative-word-of-mouth  (NWOM)  propagates  and 
ampliﬁes feelings of risk [11] through a major emphasis 
to certain “signals” which alter the magnitude of risk 
and the adequacy of the risk-management process [6]. 
All this may explain for example why familiar and well-
understood  risks  may  produce  relatively  little  social 
concern (a car accident even involving the loss of many 
lives) while a small incident in an unfamiliar or poorly 
understood risk dimension (nuclear energy, food additives, 
OGM, etc.) may have remarkable social impacts due to 
the ampliﬁcation in magnitude if the event is perceived 
as  a  precursor  of  future  and  possibly  catastrophic 
consequences [56]. Similarly it explains cases of irrational 
innovation rejection: being innovation characterized by 
structural uncertain features, the quantity and quality of 
the information base accompanying innovations or new 
technologies may act as signals of its eventual failure 
(with the associated ﬁnancial costs and losses) when the 
risks associated to a given innovation are seen as poorly 
understood and catastrophic. Small innovation failures 
conveyed by NWOM and happened somewhere may be 
considered a premonition of a disaster or heavy economic 
losses everywhere generating emotional waves reﬂecting 
very  wide  psychological,  socioeconomic  and  political 
impacts. 
Doing the right thing and knowing the right thing to do
The gap between the emotional reactions of a farmer and 
professionals’ considerations of risks related to innovation 
creates often relevant problems and signiﬁcant questions 
for innovation diffusion and techno transfer managers. 
Innovation doesn’t fall from above or grows in a “ground 
zero” condition but it is always connected to a realistic 
context  [10,  42,  47]  or  “already  existing  mentalities, 
behaviors, attitudes, approaches and practices in managers 
and staff (consolidated environment)” thus encompassing 
also speciﬁc feelings, perceptions and visions about risk. 
The  introduction  of  innovation  in  a  farm  may  imply 
some risks sometimes difﬁcult to quantify and identify 
in advance which however have to be taken into proper 
consideration to guarantee sustainable value to innovation 
and the related activities. 
Farm’s internal and external sources of risk or kind of 
activities unquestionably play a relevant role but also 
psychological attitudes, feelings and behaviours of the 
individuals involved, too often considered by proponents 
of formal analyses low proﬁle issues or producing only 
irrational  responses,  occupy  a  not  secondary  position 
within  this  discussion.  The  adoption  of  theoretical 
mathematical  models  may  provide  only  a  partial 
explanation  of  these  reactions  because  risk  aversion 
pushes show more differentiated sources and dynamics 
not  solely  ascribed  to  crude  economic  or  technical 
evaluations.  Diverse  problematic  facets  contribute 
simultaneously to generate a complex problematic issue 
in  which  those  cases  of  innovation  rejection  cannot 
therefore be simply explained by hypothesis of innate 
conservatism/impulsiveness in certain ﬁrms, economic 
sectors or class of entrepreneurs. Farmer community is 
not homogenous in several ways and this diversity can 
be observed also in the differences to adopt new ideas, 
techniques or methods or propensity to rely on tried and 
familiar approaches. 
The  case  study  of  the  passage  from  conventional  to 
organic  agriculture  has  exempliﬁed  how,  in  general, 
decision maker’s choices about the opportunity to adopt/
non adopt innovation are inspired by the idea of “doing 
the  right  thing”:  this  notion  is  however  a  composite 
entity because it includes risk management and control 
within an economic, sector and innovation dimension. 
Differentiating  these  dimensions  into  specialized 
problematic  areas  could  be  meaningless  for  farmers 
because  the  notion  of  doing  the  right  thing  may  be 
inspired by economic or technical evaluations as well as 
environmental, cultural, personal or social motivations: 
this intricate array of pushes may even legitimate reasons 
for non adoption. 
The identiﬁcation of three main problematic dimensions, 
where different kind of risks simultaneously may operate, 
are thus embraced and encompassed by a forth one: the 
behavioural one. All this evidences how relevant their 
harmonization can be (ﬁgure 3) because technical needs 
(and the related best options) with different assessments 
of  economic  and  technical  risk  exposition  have  to  be 
considered with the essential support of the understanding 
and appreciation of the farmers’ visions and opinions.
Different  risk  behaviours  contribute  to  determine 
different “style of farming”: this condition implies that 126 Journal of Central European Agriculture Vol 11 (2010) No 1
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do the right 
thing
ECONOMY
AGRICULTURE
INNOVATION
BEHAVIOUR
Economically 
viable but not 
compatible with 
farm and personal 
objectives
Not profitable 
Capital outlay is 
too high 
Too complex
Too much additional learning required 
No, scarce or conficting information
Figure 3: Operational dimensions involved in risk mitigation
any innovation diffusion programme should be linked to 
an appropriate and speciﬁc risk mitigation plan: this plan 
should be prepared, also considering gender and ageing 
characteristics given the differences in approaching to 
risk, on a particularly convincing basis related to positive 
experiences  and  mainly  linked  to  concrete  cases  and 
known  people  rather  than  crude  statistical  data.  This 
step is essential to help farmers, experts, researchers and 
extensionists in delineating together a correct problem 
framing  background  and  mitigate  real  and  perceived 
risks towards the achievement of the “right thing”. 
Furthermore, risk is surely quintessential in agricultural 
activities but eventual forms of innovation rejection or 
difﬁculties in innovation diffusion in rural areas cannot 
be described as a “mechanical” reply to context or sector 
conditions because the decision to adopt or not adopt 
in general is not a solitary choice made with little or 
no input from others: risk responses may be diffused, 
transmitted  and  ampliﬁed/reduced  by  culture  and  by 
imitation processes. 
Ignoring  the  entrepreneurs’  resistances  and  giving 
prevalence  only  to  the  expert’s  point  of  view  may 
become a very counterproductive and costly approach 
[1, 13, 32, 44, 53] because it may intensify uncertainty 
clouds,  mistrust,  fears  among  farmers  amplifying  the 
magnitude of the (economic-technical) consequences of 
eventual innovation failures and additional costs. Scarce 
farmers’ participation, poor understanding of their views, 
a marginalization of farmers’ local knowledge, ignoring 
the social, political and cultural context where adoption 
should  take  place,  are  typical  concrete  symptoms  of 
uni-directional techno transfer processes and top-down 
extension  schemes,  even  when  verbally  asserting  the 
contrary  (table  5).  This  kind  of  approaches  tend  to 
consider adoption as a singular act of an individual within 
an  isolated  context  while  adoption  is  rather  a  socio-
cultural process occurring in a heterogeneous scenario, 
where  farmers  share  and  discuss  their  visions  with 
others, composed of different understandings, different 
way of working, different values, different views about 
how to farm, etc.. Therefore an evaluation, and eventual 
rethinking, of the actual modalities adopted in innovation 
diffusion  is  a  critical  precondition  to  recognize  that 
farmers’ needs may be very different and each farmer 
may  opt  for  non  adoption  under  given  circumstances 
which are likely to be rational from the farmer’s point 
of view. There are lots of reasons why a farmer may not 
have intention to adopt an innovation also on the base 
on a “reasonable” amount of risk to deal with and each 
farmer deﬁnes what is reasonable for himself. “DO THE RIGHT THING”: INNOVATION DIFFUSION AND RISK DIMENSIONS IN THE PASSAGE FROM CONVENTIONAL TO 
ORGANIC AGRICULTURE
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Table 5: Farmers’ reactions and constraints in an uni-directional techno transfer process 
Farmers’ Reactions   Constraint 
Lack of farmers’ confidence in training, extension and 
innovation
Approaches  and  language  considered  too  academic 
and theoretical 
Judgment of farmers about risk ignored 
Overemphasis  on  technical  aspects  (other  aspects  of 
risk ignored or undervalued) 
Disengagement, weak impact, low morale  Operative agenda doesn’t address farmers’ needs 
  “Lab to Field” approach 
  Unidirectional flow of information 
  Farmers’ feelings of risks ignored 
  No active experimentations with farmers 
Ineffective  communication  of  useful  information  and 
scarce participation 
Outdated, top-down extension methods 
Lack of system approach  Key context socio-cultural issues ignored 
Farmers’ expertise undervalued or ignored  
CONCLUSIONS
A high risk aversion degree among farmers may render 
any innovation, even those directed to achieve a more 
sustainable agriculture, as something risky and uncertain: 
in case of small rural communities, where WOM, social 
stigma and peer pressures from other farmers may play a 
remarkable role, a relevant percentage of agents will be 
inclined to prefer immediate small short term results than 
manage forms of uncertainty in the mid-long run. When 
conformism is particularly pervasive and risk aversion 
widely  shared,  even  ﬁnancial  incentives  to  stimulate 
innovation  diffusion  are  unlikely  to  work  properly 
because of the higher incidence of non-economic sources 
of opposition caused by the interaction of several variables 
placed in different risk dimensions. As the case study has 
evidenced, the transition from conventional to organic 
agriculture in fact is not simply a matter of substituting 
organic  fertilizers  for  synthetic  ones:  sustainability  in 
agriculture  cannot  be  regarded  only  in  biophysical  or 
economic terms because it requires an essential cultural 
and philosophical shift within a broader notion of good 
farm management. 
All this creates a concrete need for development agents 
to  hold  realistic  expectations  about  the  degree  of  the 
change that will occur. In this case, gradual changes and 
the identiﬁcation of some pivotal individuals, showing 
more  interest  in  innovation,  opinion  leadership  and 
larger  social  networks:  they  usually  know  better  than 
the “experts” what motivates people and, fundamentally, 
may  stimulate  imitative  and  positive WOM  processes 
among  less  conﬁdent  farmers  and  rural  entrepreneurs 
with positive contributions in altering and interrupting 
conformist risk aversion behaviors. 
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